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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper reexamines economic sanctions research and identifies explanatory variables used by 
many previous theoretical and empirical research studies on the effectiveness of voluntary and 
non-voluntary economic sanctions since World War I. 
 
A normative legal, political, and economic methodology is used to measure effectiveness of 
economic sanctions as a random walk process.  The paper concludes that choosing a target and 
imposing economic sanctions is a random process that occurs when a sender is faced with a real 
or perceived threat.  Sanctions are imposed as an alternative to inaction or going to war.  The 
theory and research on effectiveness of sanctions has been a mere exercise in running regressions 
on a series of random numbers and do not shed any light to guide policymaking. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
his paper provides a normative legal, political, and economic framework to analyze and measure 
effectiveness of economic sanctions.  A non-exhaustive theoretical and empirical review of sanction 
debates is provided in the next section.  The legal regime of economic sanctions with reference to the 
United States legal system, the international humanitarian law, various Articles under the United Nations Charter, 
and the World Trade Organization is provided in the following section.  Finally, a normative legal, political, and 
economic framework (methodology) is used to measure effectiveness of economic sanctions.  The paper concludes 
that probability of success/failure of economic sanctions is a random outcome and empirical works done so far are 
flawed because of this randomness. 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE:  ECONOMIC SANCTIONS SINCE WWI 
 
The most comprehensive and serious research on economic sanctions conducted by Hufbauer et al. has 
been presented in a series of scholarly manuscripts (1985, 1990a, 1990b, and 1997; Elliot and Hufbauer, 1999).  
Hufbauer et al. estimated effectiveness of sanctions imposed between WWI and 1990 using the Gravity theoretical 
model (Frankel, 1997) and an Ordinary- Least- Squares regression estimation technique.  In their original research, 
they surveyed experts and constructed a “policy result”, as well as a “contribution of sanctions to policy results” (all 
on an ordinal scale of 1-4), to measure the success or failure of economic sanctions.  They concluded that empirical 
research on 115 cases of sanctions imposed from World War I to 1990 indicate that sanctions are more likely to 
succeed if its goal is modest, the target country is smaller than the sending country, the receiving and sending 
countries have friendly relations with substantial trade prior to imposition of sanctions, the cost to sending country is 
not significant, and sanctions are imposed quickly and decisively. 
 
The cost of sanctions to the U.S. has been estimated using the same model. Elliot (1997) argued that since 
1970, only 13 percent of unilateral sanctions imposed by the U.S. have been successful and had cost the U.S. $15-
$19 billion annually.  Despite these dismal success results, economic sanctions have proliferated since the 1990s.  
Elliot argues that prior to the 1970s, 50 percent of U.S. economic sanctions partially or fully succeeded.  The success 
ratio declined to 21 percent between 1970 and 1990. 
 
T 
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Dashti-Gibson et al. (1997) used the same data collected by Hufbauer but employed a logistic regression 
model to estimate effectiveness of sanction episodes from 1914 to 1989 in achieving their respective goals.  They 
questioned the statistical construction of the dependent variable (success measure) used by Hufbauer et al. and, 
instead, developed a binary dependent variable that assumes a value of one for success and zero for failure episodes.  
They consider six dependent variables to explain success or failure of sanctions.  These include cost of sanctions to 
both target and sending country, political stability and economic health of the target, the duration of sanctions, 
whether sanctions are financial or trade sanctions, and a secular trend variable.  Various estimation results of their 
model indicate that when the goal of economic sanctions is to destabilize the target, economic costs to target, length 
of sanctions and the stability of target are determining factors in the success of sanctions.  However, when the goal 
of sanctions is other than destabilization of the target, only the secular trend is negatively and statistically 
significant. 
 
Drury (1998) also used Hufbauer’s data in an ordered logit model to reexamine empirical results and 
recommendations made by Hufbauer et al. According to his multivariate estimation, only four out of 11 propositions 
made by Hufbauer et al. are supported. 
 
Parker (2000) provides a comprehensive critique of the methodologies used by various researchers to 
measure the effectiveness of economic sanctions.  He identifies anecdotal, case studies, and scorecards (econometric 
modeling).  He argues that anecdotal approaches deliberately choose isolated examples of effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness of economic sanctions to demonstrate their points.  The case of Cuba sanctions is a primary example 
of this.  Case studies provide a lot of detailed information but do not provide a generalized stylized framework to 
apply to all cases. He critically evaluates shortcomings of econometrics (scorecard) models, including lack of 
control group, selection bias, subjectivity, proxy problems, collinearity, and insufficient data, among many others 
(Parker, 2000 p. 259).  Oskarsson (212) argues that definition of sanctions’ success determines judgment about their 
effectiveness.  If the goal is regime change and success is defined accordingly, then many sanctions, such as the 
ones imposed on Libya and Iraq, have been a failure.  He provides some detailed information about the devastating 
impact of sanctions on the economies of Iraq, Iran, and Libya.  However, sanctions have not been successful in 
achieving their officially stated primary goal despite their effectiveness.  He agrees with Parker that generalization 
across all cases in not possible or useful and one needs to study each case individually. 
 
Rarick and Han (2010) highlight the significance of multilateral sanctions to increase the probability of 
success.  The next section briefly considers the legal aspects of economic sanctions before a normative framework 
(methodology) to measure success of sanctions is presented. 
 
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
 
While the effectiveness of economic sanctions, as a practical tool of foreign policy, has been called into 
question, the status in international law can best be described as ambiguous (Kondoch, 2011).  The source of this 
ambiguity generally stems from the nature of international law and questions of jurisdiction and enforcement and, 
more specifically, from the complex interplay of national legal regimes, the United Nations perceived role as the 
primary source of governance in the global security arena, humanitarian law, and the role of international trade 
organizations and economic interdependency. 
 
Domestic Security:  The United States 
 
Nations can and do use their own domestic law to effectuate sanctions, often as an alternative to military 
action.  National leaders find that sanctions provide at least the appearance of taking decisive steps without resorting 
to violence and are more acceptable in the international community.  Rationales for imposing sanctions include 
seeking to influence a country to change its policies, punishing a country for its policies and symbolically 
demonstrating opposition against a country’s policies to a number of possible audiences (Carter, 1987). 
 
The United States is instructive in that it is the most prolific in its willingness to apply unilateral sanctions. 
There is a tradition of employing sanctions since the colonial era, as a substitute for and complement to the use of 
force.  Carter suggests U.S. laws governing sanctions can be divided into five categories: 
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1. Government programs, such as foreign assistance and landing rights 
2. Export control 
3. Import control 
4. Private financial transactions 
5. International financial institutions 
 
Presidential authority is strongest in the areas of government programs and export control.  The President’s 
authority to deny access to large programs providing low-interest credit and loan guaranties, for example, is 
unfettered when tied to foreign policy reasons.  While Congress has the power to oppose such sanctions, to do so 
would require that body to provide strong political and practical arguments for why it opposes taking action against 
something which is objectionable to U.S. interests. 
 
The President also has broad authority over exports through the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA), 
which prohibits, with few exceptions, all exports from the U.S. unless they are licensed by the Department of 
Commerce.  While “general licenses” are not burdensome to obtain, the Executive Branch can exert greater control 
based on national security, foreign policy, or short supply.  The EAA was amended in 1985 by the Export 
Administration Amendments Act of 1975 (1985 EAAA), which placed some limits on the President’s power, 
especially regarding agricultural embargos, foreign policy controls and the “contract sanctity” provision.  This latter 
provision limited the President’s ability to impose export controls that abrogate existing contracts unless the 
President certifies to Congress that there is a serious and direct threat to U.S. strategic interests, the proposed export 
controls will help remedy that threat, and the export controls will last only as long as the threat persists. 
 
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), gives 
the President virtually unlimited authority to regulate nuclear materials, equipment and technology. This is also true 
with all arms exports under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). 
 
Unlike export controls, the President has no general statutory authority to restrict imports for foreign policy 
reasons.  Rather, his authority is scattered among numerous statutes.  For example, Section 232 of the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962 provides authority to limit imports for foreign policy reasons, specifically threats to national 
security.  However, “national security” has been interpreted to only limit imports of critical defense materials, 
especially in order to protect domestic production base or to protect against an embargo of an important foreign 
suppler.  Import controls over particular countries or specific products may also be mandated by statute.  Products 
are particularly challenging, given the multilateral structure of the World Trade Organization, as discussed 
elsewhere in this paper.  Although various statutes allow the President to regulate imports for economic reasons, 
these statutes do not provide any authority to regulate imports for foreign policy reasons (Carter, 1987). 
 
Still another approach to product sanctions is contained in Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which requires public companies to disclose whether certain minerals in their 
supply chain originate from the DR Congo or its neighboring countries.  Rather than sanctioning so-called “conflict 
minerals”, this section provides consumers with information about where and when these minerals are used, thereby 
allowing consumers to avoid purchasing products derived from that product.  This has been described as a “Second-
Order Sanction with Second-Order Humanitarian Effects” (Owen, 2013). 
 
International financial activity has grown dramatically in recent years and offers a potent area for 
imposition of sanctions.  However, it remains difficult under U.S. law to regulate private financial transactions.  One 
source of statutory authority to control U.S. private credit is section 15 of the Export Administration Act, which 
authorizes regulations that may apply to the “financing, transporting, or other servicing of exports and the 
participation therein by any person.”  While it specifically references financing, this language has never been 
interpreted to prohibit general controls of private financial transactions (Carter, 1987). 
 
While regulation of private financial transactions is difficult, the U.S. has even more limited influence over 
the international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  These two 
institutions control billions of dollars and are designed to promote cooperation within the international monetary 
community.  U.S. laws direct representatives at these various institutions to oppose certain loans or financing; for 
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instance, when the U.S. sought to cut off IMF assistance to leftist governments that engaged in human rights 
violations.  Decision-making within these institutions, however, is often done through informal consensus.  
Moreover, economic constraints have reduced U.S. contributions to these institutions and therefore U.S. influence.  
These factors underscore the fact that the U.S. exerts little real power within the institutions, but rather is limited to 
informal persuasion to build alliances (Carter, 1987). 
 
The President also has the authority to invoke sweeping emergency powers in the event of a national 
emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Power Act (IEEPA).  As amended in 2006, section 
1701(a) of the IEEPA gives the President authority “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its 
source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of 
the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.” 
 
The United States has either comprehensive or limited sanction regimes (Culvahouse, 2010). Countries 
with comprehensive economic sanctions include Cuba, Sudan (excluding Southern Sudan) and Iran.  Limited 
sanctions regimes that prohibit some, but not all, commerce are currently in place with respect to Syria, Burma (or 
Myanmar) and North Korea.  Since the Bush Administration had a preference for targeting individuals, governments 
and entities (so-called “specially designated nationals, a.k.a. SDNs), the SDN list grew significantly during his 
administration.  Culhavouse (2010) speculates that the Obama Administration has shown a willingness to relax, if 
not remove, certain economic sanctions, notably in Cuba and Iran. 
 
International Security:  United Nations Security Council 
 
Following World War II and based on the experiences of both World Wars, the international community 
worked together to devise international institutions which would ensure a “durable peace” (Reyes, 2009 p. 535).  
The institutions included the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and an International Trade Organization.  From these institutions, the United 
Nations developed into the mediator of international security governance. 
 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter sets out the U.N. Security Council’s powers to maintain peace 
and security.  It allows the Council to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression" and to take military and nonmilitary action to "restore international peace and security".  The Security 
Council is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations and its powers include establishment of “sanctions” 
as a measure to be taken against a state to promote international peace and security.  Within Chapter VII, Articles 41 
and 25, taken together, make any economic sanctions authorized by the Security Council (41) mandatory on all 
members (25). 
 
Article 41 states: 
 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give 
effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.  These may 
include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and 
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. 
 
Article 25 states: 
 
The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in 
accordance with the present Charter. 
 
Chapter V sets out the basic structure of the Security Council.  There are 15 members, including five veto-
wielding permanent members based on the victors of World War II - the United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
Russia and China.  There are also 10 non-permanent members, with five elected each year to serve two-year terms.  
This basic structure results in no permanent representation from about two-thirds of the world’s population.  Further 
isolating the Security Council’s decision-making authority is the fact that its decisions cannot be reviewed or 
modified by the U.N. Secretariat or the General Assembly and there is effectively no judicial review.  Article 96 of 
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the U.N. Charter states that the Security Council may ask the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an advisory 
ruling on its own actions, but the Court’s ruling is non-binding.  Given this basic structure, during the Cold War, the 
veto power of the permanent members, coupled with their various conflicting agendas, effectively constricted 
decision-making regarding sanctions. 
 
Jurisdiction and enforcement are two fundamental legal principles that are strained in the context of the 
Security Council’s role in economic sanctions.  First, the U.N. does not have compulsory jurisdiction.  Although the 
ICJ is charged with adjudicating international disputes, it is merely a secondary mechanism since nations must 
consent to its jurisdiction.  Indeed, even when a nation consents, it can be withdrawn if there is an adverse decision, 
as the U.S. did in the Nicaragua case.  Also, even when the ICJ issues a decision on the merits of a case, it does not 
have enforcement power and a number of nations have openly refused to comply.  The Security Council can enforce 
ICJ decisions, but its inherent discord makes it difficult to take action.  Second, although the U.N. Charter provides 
for the development of standing U.N. military forces, none was ever created.  Article 43 created a mechanism 
whereby member states would provide armed forces to serve as a United Nations standing army.  However, no 
member state ever provided those forces.  The U.N. must rely on a “coalition of the willing” in order to respond to 
specific security threats, greatly reducing its ability to regulate economic sanctions regimes (Reyes, 2009). 
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the use of sanctions by the Security Council became more prevalent 
after the Cold War ended.  During the 1990s, the Security Council imposed sanctions against eleven countries, most 
notably Iraq.  The Iraq sanctions are instructive to understanding the legal regime created by the basic structure of 
the Security Council.  In 1990, following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the Security Council issued Resolution 661 
which contained no provisions for how or when the sanctions would expire.  This created a scenario where the only 
way to end the sanctions was through action of the Security Council, which could be blocked by any permanent 
member, forcing the sanctions to continue indefinitely.  Further, under the Resolution, a committee of the Security 
Council was created to provide oversight.  Since part of the mandate for the so-called “661 Committee” was to 
address sanctions’ violations, the committee decided to operate in closed meetings, with restricted circulation of its 
minutes.  Essentially, the committee would act as its own enforcement and accountability mechanism.  Since its 
actions are secret, there was no functioning precedent to guide the committee from decision to decision, allowing for 
inconsistency and arbitrariness.  For example, Iraq would be allowed to import ambulances on one occasion and 
denied the identical application a few months later, without explanation (Gordon, 2001).  In her article Chokehold 
on the World, Gordon describes the case of Iraq Sanctions Committee as follows: 
 
I have never before heard of any bureaucratic apparatus with such an extreme aversion to transparency that the 
agenda for its meetings was not distributed to its own members and no actual minutes were kept, only summaries.  
The 6,000 decisions per year were not computerized, making them effectively unavailable, even to the committee’s 
own members.  (Gordon, 2001 P. 29) 
 
The U.N. exercise of this authority has been criticized for a number of reasons, especially humanitarian 
concerns and their ineffectiveness.  Regarding the legal structure, it has been suggested that there is a need to 
provide much more structured legal principles to guide the case of U.N. Security Council Sanctions.  In the 
“Bossuyt” Report, prepared by the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, a six-prong 
test was suggested to evaluate a sanctions regime.  First, the reasons for imposing the sanctions must be valid (a 
threat of or actual breach of international peace and security).  Second, the sanctions must target the parties 
responsible for the threat.  Third, no humanitarian goods should be targeted.  Fourth and fifth, the sanctions must be 
reasonably limited by time and effectiveness.  Sixth, any objections by governments, NGOs, intergovernmental 
bodies, scholars and the general public must be considered prior to adopting the sanctions (Kondach, 2001). 
 
Humanitarian Law 
 
There are two aspects of humanitarian international law to consider in the context of sanctions.  First, 
sanctions are being used more widely than ever as a response to perceived and real human rights violations on the 
part of the targeted states.  Second, sanctions can also be viewed as the cause of human rights violations on the part 
of the sanctioning nation. 
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While sanctions have long been a feature of foreign and national security policy, in recent years they have 
been increasingly invoked as instrumentalities of international human rights law and policy under generally 
applicable rubrics of public international law and foreign affairs law.  For instance, the U.S. trade sanctions against 
South Africa were instituted in response to that nation’s apartheid.  While those sanctions did not end apartheid, they 
are viewed as having been at least one motivating factor in South Africa’s decision to terminate that practice 
(Malloy, 2013). 
 
A more direct legal challenge to both unilateral and multilateral sanctions has been the often devastating 
humanitarian impact that sanctions cause in the target nation.  While sanctions are often viewed as more neutral and 
less devastating than military action, there is no doubt that they have always exacted a humanitarian cost (Kondach, 
2001). 
 
Humanitarian law provides several avenues to challenge the legality of economic sanctions.  First, 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is considered to be among the 
primary purposes of the United Nations.  Therefore, the Security Council must take those principles into account 
when acting under Chapter VII. Second, the doctrine of jus cogens was developed in the late 1960s and can be found 
in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969.  Jus cogens is that body of peremptory 
principles or norms from which no derogation is permitted; those norms are recognized by the international 
community, as a whole, as being fundamental to the maintenance of an international legal order.  Those norms 
include the safeguarding of peace and humanitarian concerns, including prohibitions against genocide, slavery, and 
racial discrimination.  This doctrine provides the most basic core of human rights and international humanitarian 
law, and therefore applies to the Security Council under Chapter VII.  Finally, and more generally, if the Security 
Council were to ignore the two preceding points, this disregard for the rule of law would contradict their 
responsibility for maintaining international peace and security (Kondoch, 2001). 
 
The four Geneva Conventions, the Protocols thereto, and relevant customary international law provide 
specific rules regarding humanitarian law and economic sanctions in the course of an armed conflict.  The Geneva 
Conventions and their Protocols do not address non-military sanctions because the drafters did not anticipate the 
humanitarian costs that would later accrue from sanctions that were imposed outside of armed conflicts.  This fact 
does not preclude applying customary humanitarian international law to non-military sanctions, especially given the 
fact that this area of law is “highly adaptive and widely interpreted in a dynamic way” (Kondoch, 2001 P. 284). 
 
Kondach identifies the following requirements of international humanitarian law in armed conflict. 
 
1. Starvation as a method of warfare is prohibited. 
2. There is an absolute right to humanitarian assistance, including: 
a. Free passage and distribution of relief goods, such as medical supplies, religious objects, and essential 
food stuffs, clothing and tonic, for civilian populations. 
b. Relief actions may be undertaken, subject to consent of the parties concerned. 
c. Civilians threatened by starvation or severe shortage of medical supplies, as a result of naval 
blockades, must be granted relief. 
d. Relief assistance must be provided to civilians in occupied territories. 
3. The rule of distinction provides that belligerents are required to distinguish between civilians and 
combatants at all times. 
4. The principle of proportionality requires that any collateral damage to noncombatants not be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage that is anticipated. 
 
It has been suggested that the application of these rules of international humanitarian law in armed conflict 
can be imposed either directly or by analogy to sanction regimes that are outside the context of an armed conflict.  
This argument is particularly strong when the humanitarian suffering continues into peacetime after an armed 
conflict.  It is less clear how this applies when the sanctions are not originally associated with an armed conflict. 
 
Kondach (2001) concludes that regardless of whether the Geneva Conventions and their protocols apply 
when not associated with armed conflict, the legal regime provided by human rights law and the genocide 
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convention can protect civilians from the adverse effects of economic sanctions during peacetime.  This regime 
consists of the following: 
 
1. The right to life is incorporated in numerous international human rights instruments, such as Article 6 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).  These can be interpreted to require states 
to provide essential goods to those in need or, at a minimum, to prohibit states from deliberately acting to 
deprive human beings of food and to cause hunger and starvation. 
2. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) provides, inter alia, that every child has 
the inherent right to life and the right to the highest attainable standard of health and access to medical 
services. 
3. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948, prohibits genocide in 
times of peace and war.  Genocide is described as killing or attempting to kill a group based on intent to 
destroy a national ethnic, racial, or religious group, as such. 
4. The principle of proportionality, which can be found in almost all branches of international and national 
law, requires that a balance be struck between the interest in attaining the goal of a sanctions regime and its 
interest in avoiding unacceptable harm to the civilian population. 
 
Preferential Trade Agreements and Economic Sanctions 
 
Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have increased dramatically in recent years. One recent study 
suggests that these agreements have no direct effect on the propensity of states to sanction each other (Haffner-
Burton, 2008).  Others see inherent power in PTAs, specifically the World Trade Organization (WTO), as “uniquely 
situated to act as an effective governor of national security in the economic sphere” (Reyes, 2009 p. 531).  The WTO 
governs a variety of international economic treaties which prohibit restrictive trade measures that are often used in 
the name of national security.  One such treaty - the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) - specifically 
prohibited embargos and quotas, which are economic tools often used to protect national interest.  However, Article 
XXI of the GATT provided an exception for national security: 
 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed: 
 
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to 
its essential security interests; or 
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of 
its essential security interests 
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived; 
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods 
and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military 
establishment; 
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or 
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United 
Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
 
WTO members have successfully argued that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has no authority 
when sanctions are imposed for national security reasons, which are considered too sensitive and closely related to a 
nation’s sovereignty.  The issue of determining if one of the five criteria set forth in Article XXI has been met is 
determined subjectively; the nation invoking Article XXI is allowed to make that determination without an objective 
assessment of the record. 
 
As part of the Uruguay Round, the WTO adopted a Dispute Settlement System (DSS).  There are three 
reasons the DSS is viewed as an important international tribunal.  First, there is compulsory jurisdiction over 
disputes arising under the WTO-covered agreements.  Second, decisions issued within DSS enjoy a high rate of 
compliance.  Third, members typically seek redress within the DSS rather than the alternative - withdrawing from 
the WTO altogether (Reyes).  These dispute settlement features remedy the three primary failures of the ICJ.  The 
extent to which the WTO will impact the enactment and enforcement of sanctions regimes will be closely watched 
going forward. 
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In conclusion, the legal framework for economic sanctions is comprised of multiple layers of both domestic 
and international law.  The United States’ legal regime involves both statutory and legislative authority and often 
revolves primarily around the notion of national security and the need to take action short of military engagement. 
The legal regime in international law is contained in various treaties, accords, and doctrines.  Issues of jurisdiction 
and enforcement add to the ambiguity of the status of sanctions in international law.  This uncertain legal framework 
only exacerbates the random outcomes for sanctions’ success or failure rates. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
A brief review of sanctions literature and the legal framework provided above leads to the conclusion that 
success of economic sanctions depends on many economic, political, and legal variables, as measured and estimated 
by various researchers.  These variables include sanction goals, political or economic stability of the target, presence 
of international cooperation (McLean & Whang, 2010; Kondoch, 2001), friendly or adversarial relations of sender 
and the target, threat to national security of the sender, ideological nature of the target’s regime (Takeyh & Maloney, 
2011), the duration of sanctions, the authoritarian or democratic nature of the target’s government (Lekzian & 
Souva, 2007), cost to the sender as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), cost to the target as a percentage 
of GDP, and openness of the target ‘s economy to international trade measured by sum of exports and imports as a 
percentage of GDP.  This almost exhaustive list of potential variables that could affect the outcome of economic 
sanctions could normatively be grouped into three broad factors - Economic, Political, and Legal. 
 
Almost all political and legal measures of these factors used by various researchers assign binary values of 
one or zero to explanatory variables.  For example, Druray (1998) assigns a value of one when a threat to national 
security of the sender is present and a value of zero when it is absent.  He also assigns the same binary values for 
presence or absence of multinational sanctions.  So, it is not unusual to see a multivariate regression result with 
multiple dummy variables that assume values of one or zero.  The original work of Hufbauer et al. (1990a) measured 
success of sanctions by surveying experts who assigned values of 1 to 4 to “policy results” and “sanctions 
contribution to policy results” variables.  A multiplicative index of these two variables produced the universe of all 
possible values for success/failure composed of 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, and 16.  These values were used in an OLS 
regression model as the dependent variable considering a value of 9 or greater as a success and anything less as a 
failure (Hufbauer et al., 1990a).  In conclusion, in logit or multivariate models of sanctions effectiveness, the 
universe of all possible values for political and legal factors included binary or limited ordered numbers.  The 
economic factor is generally expressed as a percentage of GDP, but given the nature of the relevant variables (cost 
to sender and target, openness to international trade, etc…) presents limited possible variations based on structure of 
the global economy and the economic position of targets and senders. 
 
This paper constructs three samples of randomly assigned numbers from the universal set of Hufbauer’s 
data (1, 2 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, and, 16) for the dependent variable (success or failure of sanctions), a dummy variable 
that assumes a value of one when a positive political or economic factor is present and a value of zero in its absence, 
and a normative set of possible economic outcomes (1, 5, 10, 15, 20, and 40 percent) to measure the impact of 
economic variables on success of economic sanctions.  Ordinary least Squares results of regressing success (failure) 
of sanctions (Y) on a constant, any legal/political factor (X1), and any economic factor (X2) are presented in Table 
1.  All randomly generated samples produce a statistically significant positive constant term and insignificant 
coefficients for political/legal explanatory variable.  Only estimation results of Sample one indicate that the 
economic factor impacts success of sanctions positively and significantly.  In all cases, the R-squares range from one 
to five percent indicating that the explanatory variables, at most, explain five percent of variations in success of 
economic sanctions. 
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Table 1:  Dependent Variable (Y) Equals Success of Economic Sanctions 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error of Coefficient t-value 
Sample 1    
X1 .811 .924 .878 
X2 7.520 3.496 2.151 
R2  .054  
F  2.754  
Sample 2    
X1 -1.072 1.036 -1.034 
X2 2.969 3.744 .793 
R2  .014  
F  .661  
Sample 3    
X1 .254 .828 .307 
X2 5.120 3.493 1.466 
R2  .023  
F  1.145  
 
The cumulative distributions of the dependent and explanatory variables for all samples are presented in 
Table 2.  As expected, the probability of drawing each item in these randomly drawn numbers is 1/n, where n is the 
number of possible outcomes.  Therefore, the average cumulative probability of success (outcomes 9, 12, and 16, 
according to Hufbauer, 1990a) across three samples is 0.31.  Also, the mean probability of existence of favorable 
legal and political attributes across the samples is 0.49.  Normatively, one could assert that the role of economic 
factors could be low (outcomes 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10), moderate (outcomes 0.15 and 0.20), and high (outcome 0.40).  
The mean probabilities of existence of low, moderate, and high favorable of economic factors are 0.508, 0.316, and 
0.175, respectively.  These random outcomes are pretty much in line with empirical research presented in the review 
of literature above. 
 
Table 2:  Cumulative Frequencies for Success Scores, Political/Legal Environment, and Economic Factors 
 Cumulative Frequency (Percentage) 
Variables Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 
Y 
Success 
X1 
Political/Legal 
X2 
Economic 
Y X1 X2 Y X1 X2 Y X1 X2 
1 0 .01 13.1 47.5 23.2 12.1 50.5 15.2 16.2 49.5 17.2 
2 1 .05 22.2 100 37.4 19.2 100 37.4 28.3 100 26.3 
3  .10 38.4  53.5 27.3  54.5 39.4  44.4 
4  .15 53.5  69.7 38.4  65.7 54.5  66.7 
6  .20 60.6  82.8 55.6  78.8 63.6  85.9 
8  .40 69.7  100 62.6  100 73.7  100 
9   82.8   72.7   89.9   
12   88.9   85.9   93.9   
16   100   100   100   
 
Countries impose economic sanctions as an alternative to inaction or going to war.  Targets are not chosen 
because of the existence of most favorable factors that would make sanctions successful.  For example, the United 
States did not impose an economic sanction on Iraq because it could receive domestic and international legal and 
political support or because Iraq’s economy was very vulnerable to sanctions.  The U.S. imposed multilateral, UN-
backed sanctions on Iraq because of its invasion of Kuwait.  Also, the U.S. would not impose a sanction on the 
European Union because of strong economic ties and openness of the EU economy.  Targets chosen are basically 
random outcomes of some political, economic, or security threats felt by the sending country.  Unlike consumers 
who may behave according to economic theory supported by empirical work, political policymakers chose targets 
based on existence of some real or perceived threat regardless of sanctions theory and research.  Thus, this paper 
concludes that the choice of imposing economic sanctions and targets is a random outcome and the probability of its 
success is 1/N, where N is the possible success outcome as defined by researchers. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper provided a legal, political, and economic framework to analyze and measure effectiveness of 
economic sanctions.  The legal regime of economic sanctions was discussed with reference to the United States’ 
legal system, international humanitarian law, various Articles under the United Nations Charter, and the World 
Trade Organization.  Theoretical and empirical research on the effectiveness of voluntary and non-voluntary 
economic sanctions since World War I were examined in order to identify variables that explain success of 
economic sanctions. 
 
A normative legal, political, and economic normative methodology was used to measure effectiveness of 
economic sanctions as a random walk process.  The paper concludes that choosing a target and imposing economic 
sanctions is a random process that occurs when a sender is faced with a real or perceived threat.  Sanctions are 
imposed as an alternative to inaction or going to war.  The theory and research on effectiveness of economic 
sanctions has been a mere exercise in running regressions on a series of random numbers and it doesn’t shed any 
light to guide policymaking.  For example, the research doesn’t guide policymakers as to when and how an 
economic sanction may be effective.  It also doesn’t provide any practical and useful information about what 
economic, political, or legal variables are significant in affecting sanction outcomes.  Also, sanctions are imposed 
regardless of existence of favorable or unfavorable conditions and structures. 
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